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Abstract
With the rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) devices,
it is imperative to proactively understand the real-world cyber-
security threats posed to them. This paper describes our initial
efforts towards building a honeypot ecosystem as a means to
gathering and analyzing real attack data against IoT devices.
A primary condition for a honeypot to yield useful insights
is to let attackers believe they are real systems used by hu-
mans and organizations. IoT devices pose unique challenges
in this respect, due to the large variety of device types and
the physical-connectedness nature. We thus create a multi-
phased approach in building a honeypot ecosystem, where
researchers can gradually increase a low-interaction honey-
pot’s sophistication in emulating an IoT device by observing
real-world attackers’ behaviors. We deployed honeypots both
on-premise and in the cloud, with associated analysis and
vetting infrastructures to ensure these honeypots cannot be
easily identified as such and appear to be real systems. In
doing so we were able to attract increasingly sophisticated
attack data. We present the design of this honeypot ecosystem
and our observation on the attack data so far. Our data shows
that real-world attackers are explicitly going after IoT devices,
and some captured activities seem to involve direct human
interaction (as opposed to scripted automatic activities). We
also build a low-interaction honeypot for IoT cameras, called
Honeycamera, that present to attackers seemingly real videos.
This is our first step towards building a more comprehensive
honeypot ecosystem that will allow researchers to gain con-
crete understanding of what attackers are going after on IoT
devices, so as to more proactively protect them.
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, a variety of devices used by people
on a daily basis has found their way to the Internet. IoT has
become one of the most hyped terminologies in industry. Ac-
cording to IDC research [1], nowadays people use various
electronic devices at least three of which are usually con-
nected to the Internet. This number is estimated to increase to
10 devices per person in the near future. Gartner [2] expects
the world to see more than 20 billion IoT devices by 2020.
Due to the increase in IoT device usage, attacks on them have
also increased. For instance, more than 20% of companies
around the world have experienced at least one IoT-related
attack in the past few years [3, 4].
Historically cyber-attacks have mostly manifest as data
breaches or compromised devices used as spamming or DDoS
agents. The emerging of IoT devices could significantly
change the landscape of cyber-attacks both in terms of mo-
tives and methods. Due to the much higher level of intimacy
IoT devices possess to people’s life, attacks on them could
result in much more devastating consequences compared with
cyber-attacks in the past. Not only do they affect more peo-
ple, but the range of possible threats has also expanded. For
instance, if cyber criminals break into an IoT camera, they
can invade people’s privacy at an unprecedented level. Such
attacks can even put people’s life in real danger (imagine an
intruder takes control of an autonomous vehicle).
Further exacerbating the situation is the repeated pattern
in the IoT industry where speed to market dominates con-
cern for security. Most IoT devices have simple accessible
vulnerabilities including default username and password and
open telnet/ssh port, to name just two. Those devices are often
installed in weak or unsecured networks like home or pub-
lic area. We are unfortunately at a time when exposure to
attacks against IoT devices has become a reality, if not worse
compared to traditional computing systems. According to
Symantec’s report [5], the number of IoT attacks dramatically
increased in 2017. They identified 50,000 attacks which had
an increase of 600% compared to 2016. New attacks such as
VPNFilter [6], Wicked [7], UPnProxy [8], Hajime [9], Ma-
suta [10] and Mirai [11] botnet also show that adversaries are
continuously improving their skills to make these forms of
attacks even more sophisticated. However, there is currently
very little systematic study on the nature and scope of those
attacks carried out in the wild. So far, large-scale attacks on
IoT devices seen in the news have been mostly about using
IoT in DDoS attacks (e.g., the Mirai attack [11]). It is impor-
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tant to understand in fuller scope what activities attackers are
engaging with IoT devices and what their motives could be.
A honeypot is a device set up for the purpose of attract-
ing cyber attack activities. It is typically an Internet-facing
device with either emulated or real systems for attackers to
target. Since these devices are not meant to have other useful
purposes, any access to them are deemed malicious. Hon-
eypots have helped security researchers for a long time to
understand various types of attacker behaviors. By analyzing
data (network logs, downloaded files, etc.) captured by hon-
eypots, researchers can uncover new tools and methods used
by hackers, attack trends, and zero-day vulnerabilities. This
information is highly valuable to improve cyber security mea-
sures, especially when organizations are resource-strapped
when it comes to fixing security vulnerabilities.
In this paper we present our first step towards a compre-
hensive experimentation and engineering framework for cap-
turing and analyzing real-world cyber-attacks on IoT devices
using honeypots. There are two main challenges for creating
IoT honeypots that can yield useful data for research.
1. The types of different IoT devices are vast, each of which
has unique features that an attacker may wish to access.
It is infeasible to build one honeypot system that can cap-
ture even a significant portion of all IoT devices. Thus,
we adopt a multi-faceted approach to IoT honeypot engi-
neering. We both adapt existing off-the-shelf honeypot
systems and build ones from scratch to create a variety
of honeypot systems for attackers to target.
2. The specific nature of attackers’ activities towards IoT
devices is largely unknown at this point, and there could
be very different focuses on the attacker’s side. More-
over, the richness of response from an IoT device is much
greater than traditional IT systems due to the interaction
with the physical world. For example, an IoT camera will
need to return some real video to look like a real device.
It would require significant amount of engineering work
to emulate those different types of responses for differ-
ent devices. Thus, we adopt a multi-phased approach
where the sophistication of the emulated responses are
gradually increased as data is gathered and analyzed to
understand what the attackers might be going after.
In the remainder of the paper, we describe this multi-
faceted, multi-phased approach in building a IoT honeypot
ecosystem, where various types of honeypots, deployed both
on-premise and in the cloud, work in concert with a vetting
system (to ensure the honeypot device looks like a real device)
and data analytics infrastructure (for collecting and analyzing
the captured data). Our ultimate goal is to attract real human
attackers and understand their motives and modus operandi,
so as to inform research on securing IoT devices in the real
world.
2 Honeypot Background and Related Work
The first honeypot was introduced in 2000 [12]. Honeypots
can be categorized into two classes: Low-interaction honey-
pot and high-interaction honeypot. Low-interaction honeypots
only emulate some services such as SSH or HTTP, whereas
high-interaction honeypots provide a real operating system
with lots of vulnerable services [12]. Honeypots are also cat-
egorized based on their purpose [13]. Production honeypots
help companies mitigate possible risks, and research honey-
pots provide new information for the research community.
Alba et al. [14] conducted a survey of existing threats and
vulnerabilities on IoT devices. The first time IoT devices were
used as a platform for large Internet-scale attack dates back
to the summer of 2016, when the French hosting company
OVH was targeted with the first wave of Mirai attacks [11].
In the follow-up attack in October 2016, Mirai brought down
the Dyn DNS provider which at the time was hosting major
companies’ websites including Twitter, Github, Paypal and
so on.
Luo et al. [15] designed an intelligent-interaction honeypot
for IoT devices called IoTCandyJar. It actively scans other IoT
devices around the world and sends some part of the received
attacks to these devices. This approach provides an easy way
to have a realistic interaction with adversaries, although it
may inadvertently bring harm to otherwise innocent IoT de-
vices exposed on the Internet. Guarnizo et al. [16] proposed a
high-interaction IoT honeypot. They used real IoT devices to
capture and analyze malicious activities. Another solution pro-
posed by Pa et al. [17] was a combination of low interaction
honeypots with sandbox-based high-interaction honeypots
implemented as IoTPot. IoTPot only monitors telnet-based
attacks. A honeypot for monitoring Zigbee protocol was of-
fered by Dowling et al. [18]. Logs from a Zigbee honeypot
were analyzed in this work. Six types of honeypots were de-
ployed by Chamotra et al. [19] to understand IoT attacks in the
broadband network. Compared to the prior work mentioned
above, our main contribution is the design, implementation,
and deployment of a honeypot ecosystem that addresses the
challenges of capturing useful attack data on IoT devices
(section 1).
3 A Honeypot Ecosystem
For honeypots to be useful for IoT security research, it is not
sufficient to just have boxes running the various emulated
or real IoT systems. These boxes need to be organized in a
way that allow intelligent adaptation on the way they respond
to different types of traffic, so an attacker can be “hooked”
and made interested in further exploring it. The deeper an
attacker becomes interested in a device, the more sophisti-
cated it needs to be in “fooling the attacker” into thinking it
is a real device. This inevitably becomes an arms race, the
effectiveness of which lies in the return of useful insights per
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Figure 1: First Step Towards a Honeypot Ecosystem
the amount of engineering efforts spent. Our goal is to create
a carefully designed ecosystem where a variety of honeypot
devices working together with a vetting and analysis infras-
tructure, so that we can achieve good “return on investment.”
Figure 1 illustrates our first step towards building such an
ecosystem. There are three distinct component: 1) honeypot
server farms (on premise and in cloud), 2) a vetting system to
ensure it is adequtely difficult for an adversary to detect the
honeypot device is a honeypot, and 3) an analysis infrastruc-
ture that is used to collect and analyze the captured data.
3.1 Honeypot Server Farms
Figure 2: Honeypot Deployment Locations
The honeypot server farms host the honeypot devices.
We use both on-premise server and cloud instances from
AWS [20] and Azure [21] in multiple countries, to create
a wide geological coverage. Figure 2 shows the geographical
locations of the deployed honeypot instances in our server
farms. The countries include France, United Kingdom, India,
Australia, Canada and Singapore. The on-premise server farm
consists of a PowerEdge R830 server with 256 GB RAM
running as VMware ESXi server, and a Synology NAS server
for storing logs. Three Fedora instances and one Windows in-
stance run on the ESXi server. The Windows instance and two
of the Fedora instances are used for deploying honeypots. The
third Fedora instance is used to run Splunk [22] to support
data analytics. The instances in AWS and Azure run Ubuntu
or Windows depending on the type of honeypots deployed.
At this stage of our research, we only use low-interaction
honeypots. For Fedora and Ubuntu instances we use docker
containers to run honeypots in them. The generated logs are
sent through syslog protocol to splunk. Networking controls
are configured through security groups so that ports open for
communication between entities within the honeypot ecosys-
tem are not visible by Internet attackers.
As explained in Section 1, given that different IoT devices
have different specifications and configurations, each honey-
pot needs to be designed and configured in a unique way. We
adopt a multi-faceted approach to building the various honye-
pot instances. We both use off-the-shelf honeypot emulators
and adapt them, and build specific emulators from scratch.
3.1.1 Off-the-shelf Honeypots
Many popular off-the-shelf honeypots emulate general ser-
vices and protocols that are not specific to IoT. However since
many IoT devices have those services, it is still useful to adapt
these existing honeypots for studying IoT attacks. We eval-
uated various open-source and commercial honeypots and
selected three off-the-shelf software to use in the first step:
Cowrie [23], Dionaea [24] and KFSensor [25]. In the rest
of this section, a brief introuduction of these honeypots is
presented.
Cowrie is a low-interaction honeypot1 that attempts to imi-
tate SSH and telnet services to attract adversaries and capture
their interaction. Cowrie provides a fake file system, a fake
ssh shell and is also able to capture files from input. It can
log every activity in JSON format for ease of analysis [23].
Since many IoT devices still use telnet and SSH protocols
1The Cowrie author uses the term “medium interaction” honeypot; but it
falls within the low interaction category based on the definition introduced
in Section 2.
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for management purposes, Cowrie is a useful honeypot for
understanding some facets of attacks on IoT devices. We run
Cowrie on Debian inside a docker container.
Dionaea is a low-interaction honeypot that emulates var-
ious vulnerable protocols commonly found in a Windows
system. The main goal of this honeypot is to lure adversaries
and capture their malicious files such as worms and malware.
Dionaea is able to simulate various protocols including HTTP,
MYSQL, SMB, MSSQL, FTP, and MQTT. This honeypot
also logs all the detected events in JSON format or inside a
SQLite database. Dionaea was released in 2013 and is a use-
ful tool for traping malware that exploits vulnerabilities [24].
We run Dionaea on Debian inside a docker container.
KFSensor is a commercial Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) that acts as a low-interaction honeypot to attract poten-
tial adversaries and record their activities. It is a windows-
based honeypot. By acting as a bait, KFSensor draws the
attention of adversaries from the real systems to itself and
provides valuable intelligence for both research and operation.
KFSensor also has some features useful for this work: manag-
ing the sytem remotely, easy integration with other IDSs like
Snort [26], and emulating Windows network protocols [25].
Since Windows has substantial footprint as an IoT operating
systems, both Dionaea and KFSensor can shed light on at-
tacks on IoT systems. We run KFSensor in the Windows VMs
on our server farms.
3.1.2 HoneyCamera
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Figure 3: HoneyCamera architecture
To capture attacks on specific IoT devices, we build a hon-
eypot for IoT camera and coined it HoneyCamera. This is
our first step towards understanding what attackers are go-
ing after for various types of specific IoT devices. Figure 3
shows the architecture of this honeypot. Honeycamera is a
low-interaction honeypot for D-Link IoT cameras. We im-
plemented it using python3. To achieve this objective, we
studied a D-Link camera and its responses to various types
of inputs were captured carefully. Honeycamera uses basic
authentication for login and repeatly plays a few seconds’ of
real video as a fake video stream from the emulated cam-
era device. We also built six different pages which emulate
the various services supported by this IoT camera, such as
password changing, reading network information, and cre-
ating new users. This helps us understand the behavior of
the adversaries. We also created a fake firmware upload ser-
vice to capture and analyze tools and exploits used during
attack sessions. Honeycamera logs all activities in JSON for-
mat. HoneyCamera runs in Clear Linux [27] that in turn runs
inside a docker container.
3.2 Honeypot Vetting
A honeypot is valuable only as long as it remains undetectable,
i.e., unknown to the attacker as a fake system. This is inher-
ently a hard task since honeypots (especially low-interaction
ones) will inevitably fail to demonstrate some observable fea-
tures only a real system can possess, or present ones a real
system will never show. The goal of the vetting process is to
identify any information leakage which leads to the identifi-
cation of a honeypot and provide remedies accordingly. We
use the server farms in the cloud as a testbed to try different
fingerprinting approaches to first make sure our honeypots
cannot be easily detected. We use some manual and automatic
fingerprinting method (e.g., through Metasploit [28]). We use
Shodan [29], an IoT search engine that can be used to search
for IoT devices on the Internet. Shodan provides information
such as service banners and metadata, and a honeyscore in
the range from 0 to 1 (1 indicates honeypot while 0 means
real system). This score provides a preliminary insight into
how good the honeypot impersonates a real device. We use
Censys [30], another IoT search engine, to help analyze our
honeypot instances to make sure they look like the real ones
they imitate. Finally, and most importantly, from the captured
data inside honeypots, attackers’ fingerprinting approaches
can be identified. Based on this insight we can create solutions
to make them ineffective. This is built in our multi-phased
experimentation process which will be explained in further
details in Section 4.
3.3 Data Analytics Infrastructure
The success of a honeypot depends on two factors: 1) the way
the honeypot software is developed and implemented; and
2) the log analysis process. Carefully analyzing the logs is
as important as the honeypot development and implementa-
tion. We use Splunk [22] for log management and analysis.
Splunk supports composing various queries using its domain-
specific language that can be leveraged to achieve various
analysis purposes in this work. All the logs captured from
our honeypots are sent to the Splunk server for further analy-
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sis. We created a Splunk app to extract valuable information
from the collected logs. Some example analyses done by the
app are identifying the combinations of username and pass-
word used by attackers, analyzing locations of the attacks,
detecting the most and least command executed during at-
tack sessions, analyzing downloaded files and sending them
directly to VirusTotal [31], storing the results and checking
attackers’ IPs through DShield [32] and AbuseIPDB [33], and
so on.
4 Multi-phased Deployment/Experimentation
We employ a multi-phased approach, as explained in Sec-
tion 1, to introduce sophistication in how our honeypots re-
spond to attackers’ traffic, based on traffic collected previ-
ously. In the first phase, we simply deploy the honeypot at
hand and receive attack traffic. From this point, the honeypot
ecosystem starts to collect data, and the analyzed data inform
the creation of the subsequent phases by understanding what
cybercriminals are looking for, so we can provide emulated
responses accordingly. This second phase goes through many
iterations until we are satisfied with the insights we gained and
the attackers’ behaviors elicited. Then in the third phase these
insights are used to create more advanced low-interaction
honeypots. We present this multi-phased process from three
facets that our honeypots attempt to capture about IoT attacks:
attacks through login service to obtain a command shell, win-
dows service attacks resulting in malware download, and IoT
camera attacks.
HoneyShell We use the Cowrie honeypots to emulate vul-
nerable IoT devices with open SSH (port 22) or telnet
(port 23). Cowrie can be configured to emulate different
types of OS platforms. Busybox [34] is a Linux distri-
bution popular among IoT devices. Thus we configure
our Cowrie honeypots to emulate Busybox. We created
three Cowrie honeypots for the three phases.
• Phase 1: the system is allowed to accept every
possible combination of usernames and passwords.
Two of these honeypots were deployed, one in Sin-
gapore (cloud) and the other on-premise.
• Phase 2: deployed on-premise and started after
6 months. The top 30 username/password combi-
nations with at least one command execution af-
ter login in phase 1 were selected. All other user-
name/password combinations would fail in this ver-
sion of honeypot. Moreover, the emulation mecha-
nisms are configured so that those commands will
produce a meaningful response to attackers, e.g.,
new usernames and file systems were added in the
configuration. Also, phase 1 logs were analyzed
to identify possible fingerprinting techniques by
attackers so they will be taken care of in phase 2.
Examples include file command’s response added
to the honeypot configuration.
• Phase 3: all information collected before is used to
create a more sophisticated honeypot. As a result, a
complex password was generated, and the number
of possible successful login combinations was lim-
ited to only one. Since the password was set to be
complicated, every successful login would imply
that it was possibly done by a real hacker which
consequently could provide valuable information.
HoneyWindowsBox We use Dionaea to emulate IoT de-
vices based on Windows platform. These attacks mostly
result in malware being downloaded on the device. It
would involve non-trivial work to further emulate the
downloaded malware’s behavior inside a honeypot; we
leave this for future work. In this work, we use phase 2
of this honeypot to apply our vetting system to ensure
they are not easily identifiable as honeypots.
• Phase 1: a default version of Dionaea was deployed
in the cloud. Our vetting system quickly identified
it as a honeypot.
• Phase 2: the various services were broken down
into two different combinations. The first honey-
pot has FTP, HTTP and HTTPS while the second
only contains SMB and MSSQL services. We de-
ployed the two versions to three locations (India,
Canada, and on-premise). The IPs popped up as a
real system in Shodan. We also deployed KFSensor
during this step. Paris and on-premise were chosen
as the locations and all deployed instances passed
our vetting system.
HoneyCamera This is our latest effort in emulating behav-
iors of a more specific IoT device. We plan to use data
collected in phase 1 to inform the HoneyShell configura-
tion in phase 2. This phase is still work in progress.
• Phase 1: three honeypots were deployed. Two in
Sydney and Paris had only port 8080 open while
the other in London had port 80. The first two hon-
eypots were used to emulate D-Link DCS-5020L
and the other one to imitate D-Link DCS-5030L
camera.
• Phase 2: a combination of HoneyCamera and Hon-
eyShell will enable us to elicit attacker’s behaviors
that involve both common Unix commands and
camera-specific commands.
5 Experimentation and Data Analysis
A total number of 18,972,475 hits were captured by our honey-
pot ecosystem over a period of one year. As shown in table 1,
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HoneyShell attracted the most hits. This information is de-
scribed in detail in the rest of this section.
Table 1: Number of Hits based on Different Honeypots
Honeypot Up Time # of Hits
HoneyShell 12 months 17,343,412
HoneyWindowsBox 7 months 1,618,906
HoneyCamera 1 months 10,157
5.1 HoneyShell
Cowrie honeypots were able to capture the largest portion
of the hits during this period. Figure 4 represents the num-
ber of hits based on locations and phases. It is notable that
the on-premise phase 2 honeypot captured more hits in 6
months’ time than the on-premise phase 1 honeypot did in a
year, clearly showing the effectiveness of the multi-phased
approach. Figure 5 shows that the majority of connections
came from China, Ireland and the United Kingdom.
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Figure 4: Cowrie Honeypot Hits per Location/Phase
Furthermore, statistics shows that 15% of the total num-
ber of hits belong to successful logins. Most of these logins
used random combinations of username and password which
shows that automated scripts were used to find the correct
authentications blindly. Table 2 represents the top 10 user-
name/password combinations that were used by attackers.
The information seems to indicate that attackers commonly
look for high-value user with a weak password. However, by
looking into the database, some other combinations such as
university/<florida>, root/university and university/student
were found inside the on-premise honeypot (inside a univer-
sity) which indicates that attackers were aware of the organi-
zation’s nature. and tried to customize their attacks based on
that.
In addition, only 314,112 (13%) unique sessions were de-
tected with at least one successful command execution inside
Figure 5: Top 10 Countries with the Most Connections
Table 2: Top 10 Username and Password combinations
Username/Password Occurrences
admin / 1234 975729
root / (empty) 167869
admin / (empty) 82018
0 / (empty) 62140
(empty) / root 52780
1234 / 1234 50305
admin / admin 39349
admin / 1234567890 12444
root / admin 10359
the honeypots. This result indicates that only a small portion
of the attacks executed their next step, and the rest (87%)
solely tried to find the correct username/password combina-
tion. A total number of 236 unique files were downloaded
into honeypots. 46% of the downloaded files belong to three
honeypots inside the university, and the other 54% were found
in the honeypot in Singapore. Table 3 demonstrates catego-
rization of the captured malicious files by Cowrie. VirusTotal
flagged all these files as malicious. DoS/DDoS executables
were the most downloaded ones inside honeypots. Attack-
ers tried to use these honeypots as a part of their botnets.
IRCBot/Mirai and SHelldownloader were the second most
downloaded files. It shows that Mirai, which was first intro-
duced in 2016, is still an active botnet and has been trying to
add more devices to itself ever since. Shelldownloader tried to
download various format of files that can be run in different
operating systems’ architectures like x86, arm, i686 and mips.
It should be highlighted that since adversaries were trying
to gain access in their first attempt, they would run all the
executable files. SSH scanner, mass scan and DNS Poisoning
are categorized in other sections of table 4.
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Table 3: Categorization of downloaded files
Malicious Files Campaign Amount
Dos/DDos 59
IRCBot/Mirai 40
SHELLDownloader 40
BACKDOOR 36
CoinMiner 31
Others 30
Besides downloading files, attackers tried to run different
commands. Table 4 shows the top 10 commands executed
with their occurrence number. By examining SSH version
banner information, the difference between human attacks
and bot attacks was identified. While 61% of the attacks are
carried by a bot, the rest (39%) are likely human attacks.
Table 4: Top 10 Commands Executed
Command Occurences
cat /proc/cpuinfo 15453
free -m 11344
ps -x 11204
uname -a 5965
export HISTFILE= /dev/null 5949
grep name 3798
/bin/busybox cp; /gisdfoewrsfdf 1141
/ip cloud print 883
lspci | grep VGA | head -n 2 | tail -1 | 532
awk {´print $5}´
5.2 HoneyWindowsBox
Dionaea was representing a vulnerable Windows operating
system. Most of the connections came from the United States
followed by China and Brazil. During the usage of Dionaea,
43 unique files were captured. HTTP was the protocol used
the most by attackers. FTP and smb were also used to down-
load malicious files. In addition, a noticeable amount of SIP
communication was found in the process of examination. SIP
is mostly used by VoIP technology, and like other services, it
suffers from common vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow
and code injection. Collected data from these honeypots was
used to create a more realistic file system for other honeypots.
KFSensor is an IDS-based honeypot. It listens to all ports
and tries to create a proper response for each request it re-
Table 5: Attack Types Executed inside HoneyCamera
Attack Type
[CVE-2013-1599] DLINK Camera
Hikvision IP Camera - Bypass Authentication
Netwave IP Camera - Password Disclosure
AIVI Tech Camera - command injection
IP Camera - Shellshock
Foscam IP Camera - Bypass Authentication
Malicious Activity
China
27%
Chile
20%
Hong Kong
14%
Mexico
13%
Thailand
5%
Canada
5%
Brazil
3%
United States
2%
Russia
1%
India
1%
Other
9%
Figure 6: Top 10 countries with most attacks
ceives. The information gathered from this honeypot was
also used to create a better environment and file system for
Dionaea.
5.3 HoneyCamera
HoneyCamera was employed to emulate three IoT camera
devices. As shown in Figure 6, most attacks captured inside
HoneyCamera were from China. Two types of malicious files
were downloaded with this honeypot: CoinMiner and Mi-
rai. Analyzing the captured logs reveals that this honeypot
attracted many attacks specifically targeted at IoT cameras.
Below are some examples:
• The first attack found was camera credential brute-force
(/?action=stream/snapshot.cgi?user=[USERNAME]&
pwd=[PASSWORD]&count=0). On this attack, adver-
saries tried to find a correct combination of username and
password to get access to the video streaming service.
• The second attack found was trying to exploit
CVE-2018-9995 vulnerability. This vulnerability al-
lows attackers to bypass credential via a “Cookie:
uid=admin” header and get access to the camera (/de-
vice.rsp?opt=user&cmd=list).
• A list of more attacks can be found in Table 5. D-Link,
Foscam, Hikvision, Netwave and AIVI were only some
of the targeted cameras inside this honeypot.
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In addition, attackers mostly (74%) used GET protocol to
communicate with the honeypot and 23% used POST method.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we present a multi-faceted and multi-phased
approach in building a honeypot ecosystem. Furthermore,
a new low-interaction honeypot for camera devices was in-
troduced. Although this honeypot is still wrok in process, it
has provided much insightful information. Analysis on the
information captured during this work shows that adversaries
generally look for vulnerable IoT devices to exploit them.
Also, results indicate that in the same network , a more realis-
tic and well-configured low-interaction honeypot can attract
more attacks compared to honeypots which is configured
poorly. Moreover, analysis of HoneyCamera’s logs shows
that IoT camera devices have become an interesting target for
attackers. Different types of vulnerabilities were found in this
process.
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